The analogy seems incongruent. But like any another metaphor whose object it is to describe a phenomenon vividly - characterising the Philippine government’s handling of the peace process with two major separatist movements, namely the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro Islamic Nationalist Front (MNLF), as akin to riding in a carriage pulled by two horses, simplifies the rather complex picture of the peace process in Mindanao.

Whether the MILF and MNLF like it or not, the government has been in the saddle, manipulating the pace of the peace process over the last few years. At times the government has pulled at the seemingly separate but inter-connected reins, while at other times, managed each horse with varying intensity, sometimes with a slight tug or a harsh whip, depending on the desired direction and purpose of the occupants of the carriage.
Rarely have both horses have run in step without having to suffer from the weight of carriage behind them, notwithstanding their unique ideological, ethnic, revolutionary and personal persuasions. As both horses are not privy to the determination of the government, mainly because of how they are positioned vis-à-vis  the peace process, the former is in a privileged position to decide which horse to favour; and by extension, which horse is to be whipped and made responsible for the mess in Mindanao.
 
Because of their blinkers, neither horse is in a position to engage in any serious protestations. Whenever one is being handsomely groomed by Malacanang to pull the carriage, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is very often found whipping the other to near death, a situation that reverses every so often. The most recent manifestation of this strategy was evidenced by the MNLF’s silence during President Estrada’s all-out war in 2000, and the MILF passive poise during various military encounters in Sulu between the MNLF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines since the arrest of long time, MNLF leader, Nur Misuari. 
 
A review of the Mindanao peace process since the 1980s reveals the relative accuracy of this metaphor, even more so when juxtaposed against the impending pull out by the International Monitoring Team (IMT) from Mindanao next month. It is no wonder that the news of pull-out was simply received by a shrug-of-the-shoulders by the Philippine government, despite the likely negative consequences for the peace process and the imminent danger of another round of protracted conflict.
 
Apparently, the IMT, headed by Malaysia decided to withdraw after registering their impatience over the Philippine government’s lackadaisical response to the peace process with the MILF. In the minds of the IMT, the latter should have been taken seriously as a peace process partner, especially since the fall out between the government and the MNLF was triggered by the failed rebellion of Nur Misuari in 2001.
 
After having been stationed in Mindanao for around four years, the IMT contingent must have observed how the Philippine government used the peace process to simply neutralise and tame the MILF, while propping up the Philippines’ international image as a genuine peace partner. In reality, it was busier attracting economic assistance and investment to Mindanao from donor countries and international agencies, rather than inking the “Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain” with the MILF to herald a genuine partnership towards peace.While admitting difficulty in agreeing to the “19 Consensus Points on Ancestral Domain” already agreed upon with the MILF because of possible trigger for the Opposition to question its constitutionality, the overarching reality is that Malacanang has never displayed any sense of urgency to sign a substantive agreement with the MILF. There are a number of reasons for this.
 
First, there is not enough pressure from the MILF to allow the government to sign a peace agreement, even a less substantive one covering ancestral domain. Second, the government has no comprehensive peace framework to rationalise any agreement with the MILF. Third, it lacks political will to pursue the peace process and to back up any agreement attendant to it. Fourth, the government is continuously harassed with no let up by more urgent national issues such corruption and scandals, and most recently, the rice crisis.
 
After hitting a snag in December last year, the government-MILF peace talks have been put on hold despite the MILF’s rallies, assemblies and other posturing towards peaceful resolution. This change of tact was not wholly unexpected - the government must have already seen the opportunity to place its bets on the MNLF horse after the relative success of the tripartite review of the 1996 Peace Agreement between the Philippine government, the MNLF and the Organisation of Islamic Conference in Jeddah last year, and Istanbul early this year. A third round is scheduled for in Manila in May this year. This gambit, defined by a back and forth process between the MILF and the MNLF can only point to a singular strategy in Manila  - to delay with a view to deny any significant headway viz. the peace process.
 
As it is, it is not incidental that the granting by the government of the right to post bail to MNLF leader Nur Misuari comes at the heel of the impending IMT pull out from Mindanao - a sure a sign the MNLF horse is ready to be taken for another joy ride.
 
Julkipli Wadi is an Associate Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of the Philippines.

source: http://www.opinionasia.org/OnaCarriagewithTwoHorses

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