By Amina Rasul

moro times

EDITOR’S NOTE: The Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy (PCID) looks at the implementation of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement at its second monthly media forum, which is sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The article below is part of the presentation today.

Sunday, September 2, marks the 11th year of the signing of the peace agreement between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). MNLF Chair Nur Misuari and former President Fidel V. Ramos were hailed as peacemakers, receiving the UNES­CO’s Felix Houp­houet-Boigny Peace Prize.

 The title of the document signed was “The final agreement on the implementation of the 1976 TripoIi Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MNLF with the participation of the Organization of Islamic Conference Ministerial Committee of Six and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference.” As the title indicates, the 1996 agreement is inextricably linked to the fulfillment of the terms of the Tripoli Agreement between the MNLF and the government under former President Ferdinand Marcos.

Autonomy was promised, to be implemented by the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) government. After the signing of the 1996 agreement, there was great hope that indeed Mindanao would be on the road to the fulfillment of its promise. Businesses and investments rose in Davao, General Santos, Ca­gayan de Oro, and Zam­boanga. Even Filipino Muslims were optimistic about the future.

Unfortunately, 11 years hence, the Muslim communities are still the poorest of the poor and peace remains elusive. To assess the implementation of the 1996 agreement, PCID focuses on the implementation of autonomy and the agreement’s impact on peoples’ lives.

What has happened to the implementation of the agreement? Where are the peace dividends?

Autonomy. The 1996 peace accord provided for genuine and meaningful autonomy for the Moro nations of Mindanao. However, there have been strong disagreements between the government and the MNLF on the status of implementation of the agreement. (Details of the points of disagreement were published in the July 27, 2007 issue of The Moro Times.)

Both sides accuse the other of not doing its part in the meaningful implementation of the agreement. Autonomy, to be effective, must be accompanied by the commensurate set of powers and funds. The MNLF claim that government has structured ARMM to fail. Did government provide Muslim Mindanao with enough political clout and resources? Central to the controversy is the issue of funding. Was it a case of unfunded mandates – national government failing to provide the ARMM with sufficient funds to produce significant changes in the region while adding on responsibilities? Or did ARMM squander the money provided?

Genuine autonomy requires its financial resources to allow the region to stand up on its own feet. Unfortunately, economic activity in ARMM is low, thus the tax base is poor. Further, Republic Act 9054 (the amended Organic Act for ARMM) has placed strategic minerals, including water, under national control. The law has removed from the ARMM the right to self-determination in the use of its own natural resources, a valuable component in the quest for fiscal autonomy.

The MNLF, on the one hand, asserted that the national government never sufficiently funded the political structures of both the transition mechanisms under the agreement, such as the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development, and the ARMM. On the other hand, the government categorically states that it has done its part in terms of appropriating money. The Philippine government, in its 2006 report to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), says that it had appropriated more than P67-billion since the forging of the 1996 Peace Agreement to finance infrastructure and other government programs. Mismanagement and corruption that attended the MNLF-led administration in Muslim Mindanao has been cited as a cause of the agreement’s failure.

Poverty and Quality of Life. Since 1997, ARMM has consistently ranked as the poorest region. Five ARMM provinces (Sulu, Basilan, TawiTawi, Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao) consistently belong to the bottom 10 provinces. Let us take a quick snapshot of the quality of life of Muslim Mindanao.

• A 2005 study by Dr. Arsenio Balisacan shows that ARMM has the lowest average per capita income growth rate from 1988 to 2003. Worse, it was the only region showing a negative growth rate (-0.5 percent)

• ARMM unemployment rate (8.3 percent) in 2005 was more than double the 1997 level. This dismal figure is worsened by the fact that skilled laborers have been leaving the areas of conflict to work outside ARMM and abroad.

• With regards to the state of health, the 2005 Philippine Human Development Report showed that the ARMM had the poorest health situation, in terms of life expectancy (bottom 5 among all provinces), infant mortality (almost double the national average), and access to public health services (number of hospitals actually declined from 31 in 1996 to 14 in 2001). Of the 3,021 government doctors in 2001, 658 work in Natinal Capital Region while ARMM had to make do with 79 doctors, respectively. This entails that there. There is roughly one government doctor per 35,000 people in ARMM.

• As for literacy and education, the indicators are no better. In 2003, simple literacy rate in ARMM (70.2 percent) was the lowest in the nation. The national average was 93.4 percent. More noteworthy is the fact that ARMM’s 2003 literacy figure is actually lower than its 1993 literacy rate (73.4 percent). ARMM’s provinces have the lowest participation and enrollment rates, the highest drop out rates.

Juxtaposing the poverty incidence in the regions with the regional expenditures and appropriations, we get a clearer picture of the nature of budgetary prioritization.

Fiscal Resources. Contrary to popular belief, ARMM does not get the allocation commensurate to the rhetoric that characterizes the discourse on Muslim Mindanao. Given the development imperatives attendant to conflict-ridden areas, one would expect massive infusion of funds to jump-start growth. The Analysis of the President’s 2002 Budget prepared by the Congressional Planning and Budget Department of the House of Representatives noted that ARMM has received comparatively less in terms of regional allocation. In 2002, ARMM received the lowest allocation (a mere 3.13 percent).

Even CARAGA, established in 1997, overtook ARMM in terms of allocation by fiscal year 2000. (See table.) CA­RAGA is not the subject of a peace agreement. Neither does it figure prominently in media as the recipient of government attention. However, very quietly, it has received more government funding than ARMM.

Since ARMM is the subject of a peace agreement, one could reasonable expect a significant increase in funding, rather than incremental growth, for rehabilitation of conflict areas and pump-priming activities necessary to spur growth.

 The appropriations for personal services are disproportionately high, at an average close to 70 percent of total expenditures for the past decade. For comparison, other local government units spent on average 47 percent of their budgets for personal services.

In terms of government expenditures per capita, regional allocation per capita in 2004 and 2005 show that ARMM’s allocation per capita did improve, from 12th place in 2004 to 7th in 2005. However, CAR—not ARMM—had the highest allocation per capita.

Government has not been successful in providing for the needs of the conflict-affected communities. Funding, management and absorptive capacity of the local governments, the peace and order situation, and corruption affect the delivery of public services.

Since the government has inadequate resources to deal with its commitments to the peace agreement and to its Muslim constituency, the international community has been visible in Mindanao, complementing the programs of government.

Donor assistance in Mindanao has been primarily employed in three major areas: basic services (poverty alleviation programs, micro-enterprise and livelihood assistance programs, and primary health care); education (including Islamic education), and infrastructure.

There must be closer monitoring and assessment of projects —nationally and internationally funded—implemented in the region to give a clearer indication of the status of these projects and their impact on the communities. To the extent that corruption at the national, regional and local levels is seen as a factor in the poor implementation of government initiatives in the region, advocacy for greater transparency and accountability among local government officials is crucial. With regards to foreign aid, how effective has it been in promoting peace and development? Is foreign aid invested in the key intervention areas where the communities truly require the assistance?

The terror of war. To ensure national security in the short run, Muslim leaders concede that there is a need for assistance to professionalize and equip the military. The July Human Rights Watch Report states that more civilians have been injured or killed in the armed hostilities in the Philippines as compared to Bali, Morocco, Spain, Turkey or Britain over the last seven years. This is in addition to the kid­nappings that have extorted huge amounts of ransoms from innocent civilians.

Although the immediacy of eliminating threats to national security is acknowledged, the military is only one part of the solution. In the conflicted areas of Mindanao, existing national security programs, which rely heavily on military solutions, have negatively affected rule of law. People are radicalized due to marginality, poverty and absence of socio-economic development in their communities. The deep-seated grievances remain to be addressed: debilitating poverty, festering land issues and ancestral domain, lack of equitable representation, discrimination.

When discussing the problem of terrorism in the Philippines, it is necessary to disaggregate international terrorism from domestic insurgency. The question that has not been satisfactorily answered is how big a threat the Abu Sayyaf really poses due to its size and diminished capacities. The answer becomes even more complicated as some public officials and “terrorism experts” link MNLF and MILF troops with terrorism.

To make matters worse, corruption, narco-politics, kidnap for ransom and other criminal activities prevent many communities from enjoying the benefits of the simple life they hope to lead, mired as they are in poverty and hopelessness.

The picture in Mindanao is made even more complex by the interlocking sets of political and familial relationships, crosscutting linguistic and tribal differences, and other sets of allegiances to individuals and political agendas. “Rido,” armed conflict between clans to settle disputes, is a clear example.

A simplistic view of the problem results in the application of a military solution to the conflict. The situation in Sulu today is a case in point. As media and some government officials continuously describe the insurgents in Sulu as part of the Misuari Breakaway Group, local leaders point out that the protagonists are MNLF, plain and simple. If the Jolo MNLF troops are not part of the terrorist attacks, military operations against them indicate a breaking of the 1996 Peace Agreement. This situation obviously cannot be publicly accepted. Thus, conflicts are attributed to MNLF renegades, lost commands, the Abu Sayyaf—never directly to the MNLF.

Rule of law versus reign of the lawless. It is evident to our communities that law and order has broken down in Muslim Mindanao. Rule of law requires democratic pluralism, an economic system that promotes the development of every member of the society, and an independent judiciary. A well-functioning justice system including prison administration, police reform, and human rights protection are essential. It also requires the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Unfortunately, the administration of justice in conflict-affected Mindanao is weak. The police are under-trained, ill equipped and under-manned. Even if the police were strong, where would they bring evidence and who would enforce it? There is supposed to be a dual judicial system in the Muslim areas: shariah for personal laws and the national justice system. Neither works very well in the areas of conflict, especially ARMM. In the case of shariah, although Philippine law provides for its implementation for Muslim communities, lack of funds seriously hamper the establishment of sharia courts in Mindanao. Moreover, many Muslim women leaders would like to participate in a review of the shariah code of personal laws to ensure gender fairness, within the tenets of our faith. As for the regional and local governments, there is consensus that these units are ineffective.

People have very poor expectations that the ARMM government can provide honest government, maintain peace and order, and provide for basic services. Thus, ARMM’s administrative capacity, transparency and accountability in governance have to be improved.

Conclusion. On Sunday, 11 years will have passed since the signing of the Peace Agreement. ARMM is still caught in a vicious cycle of conflict and poverty. Autonomy is weak. Clearly, the 1996 peace accord has been derailed.

The dependence on military solutions and the ineffectiveness of the implementation of the PA and the militarization in Muslim Mindanao will force an already burdened people to a point of no return where armed groups will be able to gain recruits.

As we all strive to maintain a strong security presence in the region, we must stress that peace and security cannot rest on military operations alone. Economic growth and democratization (with its pillars of justice, rule of law and protection of rights) are keys to peace in the region. Defense against terrorism is one area that should not be left to the government alone, whether central and regional. There is a need to establish the basic conditions that will allow the communities themselves to participate in processes which will usher in and foster peace and development in Mindanao. Government is not the only stakeholder in the development process. Civil society, people’s organizations, and others need to be involved.

 “There never was a good war or a bad peace.” While the Muslims of Mindanao stand behind government to stop terrorism, care should be taken not to implicate uninvolved groups in the process. Muslims are becoming convinced that there is a conspiracy, which indiscriminately links even legitimate groups to terrorism in order to substantiate the threat.

The MNLF, agencies of government and the donor community need to strengthen the foundations for democracy as well as implement development and poverty alleviation programs more effectively. Without development and strong democratic institutions, the roots of terrorism will find fertile soil. Unless the deeply rooted grievances are addressed simultaneously, a military solution will only alienate the community. Unless the Liberation Fronts sincerely support the peace and development agenda, the armed hostilities will become intractable.

It is time to change the paradigm. Martin Luther King Jr. said “One day we must come to see that peace is not merely a distant goal we seek, but that it is a means by which we arrive at that goal. We must pursue peaceful ends through peaceful means.”

A just peace is a lasting peace. 

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