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by: Maugan Buat Mosaid, Ph.D.
Has anyone pondered on why there was no official representation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as an organic entity in Philippine geo-political structure and the most affected, in the negotiations for peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Bangsamoro fronts? Was it assumed to have been taken cared of by the members of the GRP panel? Or, is this necessary at all?
As a juridical entity, having distinct personality and life of its own, the ARMM must assume position in the negotiations for peace, and therefore, it deserves a seat in the GRP Peace Panel. The ARMM is being run by more than 10,000 strong personnel and their well-being must be considered in the ‘talks’ through their legitimate representative. Such well-being cannot just be resigned to fate or be decided upon with impunity by any of the parties.
The invitation for ARMM Regional Gov. Datu Zaldy Puti U. Ampatuan to participate in the review of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in November 2007 underscored the importance of ARMM’s visible role in the peace process. This role for ARMM should have been engaged at the start of negotiations. The ARMM (and SPDA) was made part of the concessions for the MNLF yet it was not given the chance to speak up for itself. The Lumads, too, have been clamoring for substantial participation in the peace process.
Whatever the ARMM does produces ripples that affect the peace process. On the part of the Bangsamoro, they will always look at the ARMM as an important instrumentality of the government. When it shows only dismal performance, it becomes a good example of blame for the half-cooked autonomy that it has been. Likewise, the ARMM’s participation (or non-participation) in the peace process will be seen as a measure of how the GRP affords its regard (or disregard) of this autonomous government. Simply stated, the ARMM, for whatever it is (or has been) is the peace process being rendered in practicum in the Bangsamoro homeland, and therefore, its success or failure has so much bearing on the peace process.
It was awful to note how both parties seem to downplay the importance of ARMM’s participation in the peace process. The present leadership of the ARMM cannot be faulted for getting such trivial treatment. In his first and second SORA (state of the region address) Regional Governor Datu Zaldy U. Ampatuan expressed goodwill to support the peace process between the GRP and the Moro fronts – something too important to remain as lip-service.
What could be the reason for such superficial treatment?
On the side of the MILF, it may be due to the fact that it did not recognize the ARMM’s existence from the very beginning. It has never demanded for an autonomy like the ARMM nor was it a party to its creation. The irony is that it is difficult to distinguish the MILF’s constituents from ARMM’s constituents that it serves or has been serving for the past 17 years.
On the side of the GRP, it may be due to the fact that the President of the Philippines exercises authority and supervision over the ARMM, and therefore, there is reason to take for granted ARMM’s participation in the negotiation, or if ever necessary, this can be articulated by the members of the GRP panel. That, of course, is hypothetical. Be that as it may, it is not always right to assume that a mother can always speak up for her daughter even if she knows her too well.
The prospect of signing a GRP-MILF agreement on ancestral domain looms and the ARMM, over and above other Muslim-dominated villages that may be included in the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), is part and parcel of the coming agreement. As to how the Muslim-dominated villages (outside ARMM) and the present ARMM would be merged, given the present organic act (RA 9054) and the 1996 Peace Accord, is not yet clear. What is clear is that the ARMM is in the pipeline for a possible concession to another party, the MILF. And (again) it has to concede in silence.
How would this be reconciled with the 1996 Final Peace Agreement? While it is always possible to pass another organic act to amend RA 9054 it is not prudent to pass a law amending the 1996 Final Peace Agreement at a time when the MNLF (the first concessionaire of the ARMM) is clamoring for more substantial implementation of the 1996 Accord. The other point is that the ‘Agreement’ was a product of bilateral efforts between two parties while a law can be a solitary act of Congress, and therefore, a law amending a bilateral agreement is ridiculous and absurd.
But why was the first concessionaire of the ARMM seems to be booted out of its supposed political turf when, as agreed, the passing of an organic act expanding the area of coverage of the ARMM would take care of Phase 2 of the Agreement?
The reality is that RA 9054 has to operate, inclusive of whatever shortcomings it has, as the MNLF would admit later. The qualification for Regional Governorship and Vice Governorship of the ARMM is very basic: among others, one does not have to be an organic member of the MNLF to be eligible to run for these positions. Was this overlooked if the spirit and intent of expanding the ARMM was to give way for the MNLF, as a concessionaire, to exercise and express some semblance of political right over the ARMM? Maybe not, but because the MNLF’s participation in the crafting of RA 9054 was only limited to a certain extent, then Congress, where the tyranny of numbers sometimes prevail, did not have much time to peep deeper into that ‘hole’. If the ARMM, that time under the stewardship of MNLF Chairman and Gov. Misuari, did more than enough to lobby for critical concerns that will have to be incorporated into the law, RA 9054 may be a little bit different or slightly better from the point of view of the MNLF.
The MNLF could not be caught up in the process with its pants down because there was enough time to lobby and Nur Misuari’s joining the government was a priceless break for Pres. Ramos at that time. In other words, there was good opportunity for the MNLF to do what would have been done to shape up RA 9054 the way it should be. In fact, the scheduled elections for the ARMM at the end of the term of Regional Governor Misuari in 2001 have been postponed twice to make sure that the amendatory law comes out in the incumbency of Chairman Misuari. Until the holding of the plebiscite for RA 9054 in August of 2001, the MNLF was silent on the law or nothing much was said against it.
Then the election for the ARMM came in November 2001 and the erstwhile Foreign Relations Minister of the MNLF, Dr. Farouk Hussin, was elected Regional Governor. When the Hussin administration was lurking in power under RA 9054, it was only all praises for the law. Matter of fact, his preface in the reproduced copy of RA 9054 was an all-out expression of gratitude and high expectations for what the law can do for the constituents of ARMM. But upon exit of the Hussin administration (in the later part of 2005), the MNLF began to sound off disgusts and came out with the opinion that RA 9054 did, in fact, violated the 1996 peace accord. RA 9054, the MNLF retorted, was not the answer to Phase 2 of the Agreement.
What about the on-going peace process with the MILF? The MILF hopes to be different in some respects. With so much to learn from the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement, it is in a better position to sign a ‘superior’ agreement. Mr. Mohagher Iqbal, Chair of the MILF Peace Panel, stressed the following points: “If the MILF enters into a peace agreement with the Philippine government, there will be three major points where we differ [from the MNLF]:”
1. “Difference in approach: Under the MNLF peace agreement, Misuari gave so much emphasis to foreign participation, i.e. the involvement of the OIC. In our case, though we welcome the OIC and other Muslim states, we can pursue peace talks on our own because we emphasize internal factors.”
2. “Different political approach, especially on the question of territory. MNLF asked for 14 provinces and 10 cities. [The] MILF does not give so much emphasis on autonomy. It seeks to establish an independent Islamic Government in areas where Muslims are predominant.”
3. “On plans to develop and uplift the living conditions of the Muslims: [In the case of the MNLF] projects for the development of Muslims, Highlanders and Christians were conceptualized only after the signing of the [final peace] agreement. Under the MILF, we are already involving them with some livelihood and development projects in order to uplift their living conditions even before we have entered into an agreement with the GRP. This is because we give more importance to self-reliance, to internal factors rather than external ones, especially aid.”
The MILF has a more conservative approach in the peace negotiation than the MNLF. While the GRP’s integrative approach was accepted by the MNLF, the same strategy may not work with the MILF. The MILF position that it negotiates within the framework of self-determination and historical realities seems non-negotiable. Though it welcomes the participation of the OIC and some Muslim States, the MILF is cautious at being persuaded to soften its stand on fundamental issues.
On the other hand, the GRP Peace Panel has been consistent in its stand: First, it cannot negotiate outside the framework of the Philippine Constitution, for if it does, it ceases to be a legitimate representative of the Philippine government. Second, any realignment of geo-political territorial boundaries shall have to be sanctioned by Congress and pass a plebiscite. We know that these are distasteful to the MILF.
We have seen how occasional impasse in the negotiation occurs and this happens when two parties have seemingly irreconcilable frameworks for the negotiation. Despite all these, it was interesting to note that the peace process has been progressing through. Though painstakingly slow, it is enough that both parties talk and do not cease at finding creative ways and adept means to resolve the issues. This time, the agility of both parties shall be put to test again as both camps turn their backs against each other at the resumption of talks in Malaysia in December 2007 due to the GRP Panel’s insertion of the phrase ‘in accordance with constitutional processes’ in the draft Memorandum of Agreement. The GRP Panel believes that the proposed Bangsamoro juridical entity [or homeland] be subjected to a plebiscite which the MILF panel vehemently opposed. Thus, the talks bumped into another impasse! For how long will the talks stay in this situation? Nobody can tell.
Maybe there are a few people who must have sighed in relief and considered this a ‘break’ rather than an impasse. If ever, this can only come from people organic to the ARMM who would rather see and feel some sense of comfort at such a situation than see ARMM’s fate being decided upon with such impunity.
But for all we know, this lull maybe a blessing-in-disguise as this could be an opportunity to contemplate on whether or not to allow ARMM’s more concrete participation in the peace process. The ARMM already missed a good point in the crafting of RA 9054. It must not miss another good point this time around.
As it is, the ARMM is completely expressionless under situations of an ‘agreement’ and ‘disagreement’. It hangs in suspended animation anticipating the next scenarios that unfold before its very eyes and wish that the ‘new occupants of the house’ shall be kind to its lowly ‘residents’.
Before two contending powerful forces where there is no way out, one can only resign its outcome to fate. A law in Physics states: “When an irresistible force meets an immovable object, something has to give up”. When such a situation comes (and we pray it won’t), we hope it is not the ARMM that will have to give up all the modest treatment and respect that it deserves from both parties.
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